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ONE NOT LIKE THE OTHER:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE USE OF THE AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION ANALOGY IN REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION CASES UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT
JAMELIA N. MORGAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
a statute enacted with the purpose of "provid[ing] a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities."1 The ADA was the culmination of
decades of advocacy on behalf of individuals with disabilities and
represented a tremendous achievement for the disability rights movement.2
At the heart of the statute is the reasonable-accommodation mandate,
which requires employers to provide "reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability who is an applicant or employee." 3  Employers are
required to accommodate reasonable requests "unless such covered entity
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the business of such covered entity."4 Under the ADA,
a qualified individual refers to "an individual who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires."5
Copyright © 2018, Jamelia N. Morgan.
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'42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012).
2 See Arlene B. Mayerson, The History of the Americans with Disabilities Act: A
Movement Perspective, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FuND (July 1992),
https://dredf.org/news/publications/the-history-of-the-ada/ [https://permacc/6U47-FC4B].
3 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
41d.
5 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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While expanding the scope of protections for individuals with
disabilities, the statute also ushered in a new framework for equality--one
that focused on treating individuals differently to ensure their equality.6
By including in the defmition of discrimination failure to make reasonable
accommodations for individuals with disabilities, Congress signaled its
intention to require employers to take affirmative steps towards ensuring
the integration of disabled individuals into the workplace,7 subject of
course to the limitation that accommodations be reasonable and not impose
an undue hardship on employers.8
Despite these clear limitations on the scope of the employer's
particular accommodation duties, some courts have expressed strong
reservations about the precise nature of these duties mandated by the ADA,
particularly when the reasonable accommodation requests are depicted as a
form of preferential treatment.9 Other courts have focused in on the
reasonableness of the accommodation request and have emphasized the
affirmative, yet neutral, requirements of the ADA as essential components
ensuring the statute's effectiveness in integrating disabled individuals into
the workforce."0 Still others have regarded the statutory requirements as
mandating the removal of structural barriers and have acknowledged that
such mandates may indeed require preferential treatment in some cases. 1
This Article discusses the debate within the courts regarding the
employer's affirmative obligations under the ADA's reasonable
accommodation clause by focusing on the use of the affirmative action
analogy. The purpose of this Article is to examine the evolution of the
affirmative-action analogy in reasonable-accommodation case law over
time and to decipher its meaning and relevance. At the onset, it is
'See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DuKE L.J. 1, 3 (1996).
7 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002).
8 EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 353 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Independently of the
undue hardship provision, an employer is required to make only those accommodations that
are 'reasonable."') (citation omitted).
9 Stephen F. Befort, Accommodating an Employee's Commute to Work Under the ADA:
Reasonable, Preferential, or Both?, 63 DRAKE L. REv. 749, 750-51 (2015).
10 E.g., Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401.
1 Befort, supra note 9, at 784.
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important to establish a few definitions and assumptions. First, the
affirmative-action analogy refers to cases where courts liken or compare
the plaintiff's reasonable-accommodation request to affirmative action.
Specifically, the Article examines cases where the term "affirmative
action" explicitly appears in the text of a court opinion where a reasonable-
accommodation claim is at issue in the case. Second, the Article does not
present a stance on whether reasonable accommodation is a type of
affirmative action. Instead, the Article presents an overview of case law
and legal scholarship to support both sides of the debate regarding that
question. Rather than contribute to what is already an extensive debate on
that question, this Article seeks to demonstrate that there are several
different definitions of affirmative action at play in the reasonable-
accommodation case law, and not all uses are based on the preferential-
treatment definition-a focus of much of the commentary on the matter.
12
Although these different definitions of affirmative action are present in
court opinions, they are regarded as one monolithic definition, which
confuses the analysis across cases and obscures the actual context of the
reasonable-accommodation request.
This Article is divided into four main parts. Part II describes the
origins of the affirmative-action analogy both in disability case law as well
as cases concerning reasonable accommodations-the focus of this Article.
Part M tracks the frequency in usage of the affirmative-action analogy
over time, starting after the passage of the ADA in 1990 and continuing to
the present day. Part IV catalogues the various definitions of affirmative
action utilized by courts. Part V attempts to decipher the various meanings
of affirmative action in the reasonable-accommodation case law. In Part
V, the Article demonstrates first, that the use of the affirmative-action
analogy is frequently misplaced and rarely accompanied with sufficient
analysis to justify its use; and second, that the definition of affirmative
action varies across opinions and, as such, limits the analogy's general
applicability. Ultimately, the Article closes by revealing the debate on
preferential treatment under the ADA's reasonable-accommodation
requirement as the most plausible explanation for the persistent presence of
the affirmative-action analogy in reasonable-accommodation case law.
12 See id. at 754.
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II. ORIGINS OF THE AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION ANALOGY
To understand the use of the affirmative-action analogy over time, it is
imperative to first know its origins. This Part provides an overview of the
earliest references to the affirmative-action analogy in first, disability law,
and then, reasonable-accommodation cases more specifically. In addition,
this Part provides an overview of the legal scholarship animated by the
question of whether reasonable accommodation is a type of affirmative
action.
A. Earliest References by Courts
1. Southeastern Community College v. Davis 3
The earliest reference to affirmative action in disability law is found in
the Supreme Court's opinion in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis.14 Davis sought admission to Southeastern's nursing program but
was denied after Southeastern determined that she did not meet the
requirements for the nursing clinical program. 5 Due to her serious hearing
disability, Davis relied on lip-reading to comprehend speech, but the
college found this insufficient to meet the standards of the clinical
program.' 6 Southeastern determined that Davis's disability would prevent
her from safely completing the clinical program and hinder her from
properly assisting patients as a professional in the field.'7 After being
denied admission to Southeastern's nursing program, Davis brought suit
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination in
federally-funded programs against otherwise qualified disabled individuals
solely on the basis of their disabilities.' 8 Ruling in favor of Southeastern,
the Supreme Court held that Davis was not a "qualified individual" within
the meaning of § 504 and that the college was free to establish reasonable
physical qualifications for its program.' 9 The Court reasoned that, in
13 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
14Id. at 411.
15 Id. at 400-02.
16 Id. at 401-02.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 400, 402 (citing Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012)).
19 Id. at 414.
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contrast to § 503(a) of the Rehabilitation Act, which governs federal
contractors, entities under § 504 were not required to adopt affirmative
action to provide disabled individuals with educational and employment
opportunities. 20 Specifically, the Court found that "neither the language,
purpose, nor history of § 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative-
action obligation on all recipients of federal funds."2
Moreover, the Supreme Court noted in Davis that "the line between a
lawful refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination
against handicapped persons" will not always be clear.2 2 The Court noted
that there will be cases where the refusal to alter admissions standards will
have the result of arbitrarily denying opportunities to individuals with
disabilities. 23 Furthermore, advances in technology may enable some
individuals with disabilities to readily meet the program requirements with
the assistance of low-cost technical devices. 24 Accordingly, as the Court
opined, "[S]ituations may arise where a refusal to modify an existing
program might become unreasonable and discriminatory."2 5 Until then, the
Court reasoned, requiring Southeastern to admit Davis would amount to
Southeastern effectively lowering its standards for admissions.
26
Ultimately, as the Court concluded, "Section 504 imposes no requirement
upon an educational institution to lower or to effect substantial
modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person."
27
The Davis Court's concern that colleges and universities would have to
lower their admissions standards in order to admit disabled students
animates much of the Davis opinion and much of the disability case law in
the employment and education context.28 Indeed, similar concerns also
2 0 Id. at 410-11.
21 Id. at 411.
12 d. at 412. This observation proved particularly prescient as will be described in
greater detail below.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 1d. at 412-13.
26 Id. at 413.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 413-14. See also, e.g., Dopico v. Goldsclunidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652 (2d Cir.
1982) ("Davis used the term 'affirmative action' to refer to alteration of the standards or
(continued)
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crept into cases in the reasonable-accommodation cases under the ADA,29
despite the Supreme Court's later insistence that the reference to
affirmative action in Davis was misleading.3" Of course, it should be noted
that the reference to affirmative action made sense in the context of a
discussion on the Rehabilitation Act, where the term "affirmative action" is
explicitly stated."a In Davis, the Court referred to affirmative action to
distinguish the requirements under various sections of the Rehabilitation
Act and to emphasize that affirmative action was required under § 503, for
example, but not under § 504-the subsection at issue in Davis.32 Even so,
the Court sought to clarify in Alexander v. Choate what its reference to
affirmative action actually meant in Davis.3 3 In Alexander v. Choate, "the
Court explained that 'affirmative action' as used in Davis '[r]eferred to
those "changes," "adjustments," or "modifications" to existing programs
that would be "substantial" or that would constitute "fundamental
alteration[s]" in the nature of a program... rather than to those changes
that would be reasonable accommodations.' 34  Despite the attempt at
clarification, the language of affirmative action was exported to a variety
of contexts within disability law, including the employment context for
cases concerning reasonable accommodations. 35  Indeed, several
conflicting and competing defmitions of affirmative action began to appear
in reasonable-accommodation cases brought pursuant to the ADA.36
qualifications by which applicants to a program are selected, if those standards unfairly
exclude a certain group.").
29 See infra Section IV.C.
30 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300-01 n.20 (1985).
"1Davis, 442 U.S. at 410 (citing Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 503(a), 29
U.S.C. § 793(a) (2012)).
32 Id. at 410-11.
33 Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300 n.20.
34 Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 337 (3d Cir. 1995) (alterations in original) (quoting
id.).
35 See infra Part III tbls.t-2.
36 See infra Part IV.
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2. Daugherty v. City of El Paso 37
After the passage of the ADA, the first reference to affirmative action
in the reasonable-accommodation context by a court of appeals appeared in
the Daugherty case, a case decided by the Fifth Circuit.38 The plaintiff,
Daugherty, was employed as a public coach bus operator.39 After being
diagnosed as an insulin-dependent diabetic, Daugherty was placed on a
leave of absence without pay and released from his position." Daugherty
brought a reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA arguing that he
was entitled to a reasonable accommodation from the City in one of two
ways. First, Daugherty argued that, given his insulin-dependent diabetes,
the City should have pursued a waiver to exempt him from the Department
of Transportation's requirement to dismiss him from his position as a
commercial motor vehicle operator due to that medical condition."
Second, Daugherty contended that the City should have reassigned him to
another comparable position. 2 Although there were disputes in the case
regarding whether the Department of Transportation (DOT) waiver was
indeed possible,43 the Fifth Circuit resolved the question on other grounds.
Finding that Daugherty was not a "qualified individual with a disability"
for the bus driver position, the court held that the City lacked the legal duty
to accommodate him by obtaining a DOT waiver.44
After disposing of the plaintiff's first argument, the court then
addressed Daugherty's contention that the City had a legal duty to find him
another position within the City.45  At the time, the City's charter
governing the process for filling vacancies required that vacant positions
be filled with full-time employees before the positions became available to
" 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
38 1d.
39 1d. at 696.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
431 d. at 697.
44 Id. at 698 ("This essential element of his claim is lacking even if the city could have
accommodated him by obtaining a waiver.").
45 Id.
2018]
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part-time employees like Daugherty.4' The City argued that if it reassigned
Daugherty to one of the vacant full-time positions, it risked a lawsuit from
other full-time city employees.47 In ruling for the City, the Fifth Circuit
emphasized that the City's legitimate policy should not be altered to
accommodate Daugherty, and furthermore, the City was not "required to
fimd or create a new job for [Daugherty]. '  Concluding that the City was
not required to fundamentally alter its program, the court noted that
Daugherty was not treated any differently from other employees and as
such had no claim under the ADA.49
In closing, the court stated-in what has become a frequently-cited
passage5 -that affirmative action was not required under the ADA:
Stated another way, we do not read the ADA as requiring
affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities,
in the sense of requiring that disabled persons be given
priority in hiring or reassignment over those who are not
disabled. It prohibits employment discrimination against
qualified individuals with disabilities, no more and no
less.5
That passage introduced into the reasonable-accommodation context
both the affirmative-action narrative, as well as the corresponding debates
regarding the intrusiveness of mandates that require different treatment for
individuals with certain traits, such as disability. That debate extended
beyond the walls of the courthouse and into legal academia.
B. Debate: Is Reasonable Accommodation a Type of Affirmative Action?
Soon after the passage of the ADA, legal scholars began to weigh in on
the substantive meaning of the statute's reasonable-accommodation
provisions, including how the statute aligned with previous anti-
46 ld. at 699.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 700 (quoting Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 1991)).
49 Id.
See cases cited infra note 96.
51 Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700.
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discrimination statutes like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.52
Scholars noted that the ADA, contrary to previous anti-discrimination
statutes, "assumes that individuals who possess the quality or trait at issue
are different in a relevant respect from individuals who don't and that
'treating [them] similarly can itself become a form of oppression."'
' 53
Scholars noted that in some cases the ADA required that disabled
individuals be treated differently from other nondisabled individuals to
ensure that the nondisabled individuals had equal access employment
opportunities. Karlan and Rutherglen clearly articulated this point by
noting that "[r]easonable accommodation clearly rests on a difference
model of discrimination since it requires employers to treat some
individuals-those disabled persons who would be qualified if the
employer modified the job to enable them to perform it-differently than
other individuals.,
54
Although scholars accepted what Karlan and Rutherglen dubbed as the
difference model of equality, scholars disagreed first on whether the"
ADA's reasonable-accommodation requirements constituted a form of
affirmative action,55 and second, accepting that reasonable accommodation
constituted affirmative action, whether the reasonable accommodation
constituted preferential treatment as that term is defined in the race- and
sex-based affirmative action context.5 6
In their responses to these questions, legal scholars aligned into four
respective camps. The first group of scholars argued that reasonable
accommodation was in fact a form of affirmative action, with affirmative
52 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012).
" Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 6, at 10 (quoting Daniel R. Ortiz, Feminisms and
the Family, 18 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 523, 524 (1995) (alteration in original)).
4 Id. at 10-11; Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The
Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1431 (1991) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)) ("Reasonable accommodation and affirmative action do stem from a common belief,
namely that 'in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently."').
" Id. at 14.
56 Id.
20181
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action defined as preferential treatment.57 A second group of scholars also
argued that the ADA's requirements, including reasonable
accommodation, were a form of affirmative action. They defined
affirmative action not as preferential treatment but as the removal of
structural barriers to employment.58 The third group of scholars argued
that the reasonable-accommodation requirements were not a form of
affirmative action, with affirmative action defined as a remedy for past
societal discrimination. 9 The final group of scholars also argued that
reasonable accommodations are not a form of affirmative action; rather,
they defined affirmative action as preferential treatment.6°
57 E.g., id. ("Reasonable accommodation is affirmative action, in the sense that it
requires an employer to take account of an individual's disabilities and to provide special
treatment to him for that reason.").
58 See, e.g., CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK:
MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 108 (1997) (arguing that the ADA is "the
most radical affirmative action program in the nation's history").
" E.g., Sharon Rennert, Note, All Aboard: Accessible Public Transportation for
Disabled Persons, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 360, 380 (1988) (discussing affirmative action in the
context of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act) ("[Aiffirmative action refers to a remedy for
systemic discrimination, and involves a policy of active recruitment of members of a
victimized group. Accommodation, on the other hand, refers to the modification of
programs, facilities, or operations to allow disabled people to gain access.... By confusing
these two concepts, the Court unfortunately created the impression that the duty of
accommodation is limited.") (footnotes omitted); Nicholas A. Dorsey, Note, Mandatory
Reassignment Under the ADA: The Circuit Split and Need for a Socio-Political
Understanding of Disability, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 443, 477 (2009) ("Requiring employers
to make reasonable accommodations, including reassignments, is not 'affirmative action' to
employ disabled individuals because of their class status; rather, it is an embodiment of the
idea that society cannot challenge environmental and attitudinal discrimination in the same
ways it countered biases against other marginalized groups.").
I See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1045, 1049 (2000) ("Despite some similarities with conventional
forms of affirmative action, the concept of reasonable accommodation as embodied in the
ADA is significantly different from affirmative action in other contexts."); Cooper, supra
note 54, at 1431-32 ("Affirmative action involves more than merely allowing the members
(continued)
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As the debates on the question of whether reasonable accommodation
constitutes affirmative action suggest, there are valid arguments to support
and reject the claim that reasonable accommodation is a type of affirmative
action.6' Even within the scholarship, however, there are varied and
sometimes conflicting definitions of affirmative action, which make it
difficult to utilize the term without clarifying which definition is being
used. For example, although Karlan & Rutherglen argue that "[r]easonable
accommodation is affirmative action in the sense that it requires an
employer to take account of the individual's disabilities and to provide
special treatment to him for that reason," 2 the authors continue their
argument by distinguishing the type of affirmative action operating in the
reasonable accommodation context from the affirmative action in the race
and sex context.63 In short, each author addressing the question does not
necessarily have the same definition of affirmative action in mind.
In the context of legal scholarship, it is perfectly reasonable to have
authors set the definitions for the terms they plan to reference in the course
of their arguments. When citing to these arguments, other legal scholars
would be wise to list the assumptions and definitions that inform the
particular arguments made. Yet, as described below, courts deciding cases
in the reasonable accommodation context utilize differing definitions of
affirmative action, often without acknowledging these differences or the
context in which the term is employed.
III. USE OF THE AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION ANALOGY OVER TIME
This Part maps the usage of the affirmative-action analogy over time.
All reasonable-accommodation cases brought pursuant to the ADA from
of a protected class to compete on equal terms with others; rather, it affords the protected
class the advantage of different selection criteria with the explicit goal of increasing the
participation of the protected class.... In contrast to affirmative action, reasonable
accommodation is in theory not remedial. Instead of looking to overcome the effects of
past discrimination, it focuses on overcoming present obstacles to employment.").
61 For a discussion on the relationship between affirmative action and reasonable
accommodation, see Christine Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation,
115 HARv. L. REv. 642, 697-98 (2001).
62 Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 6, at 14.
63 Id. at 14-16.
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1990 to 2017 that included explicit references to affirmative action were
included in this data set. The data is separated into two categories:
appellate cases and district court cases. Cases were included if they
specifically referenced affirmative action in denying a reasonable-
accommodation claim or referenced affirmative action in upholding or
granting a reasonable-accommodation request.
As the data' presented in the charts below demonstrate, the majority
of appellate and district court opinions that included references to the term
"affirmative action" were decided from 1996 to 1998 and 1999 to 2001,
respectively. 65  There are several explanations for the initial increase in
cases referencing affirmative action; two will be mentioned here. First, the
6 A note regarding the data: This data set includes all court opinions that referenced the
term "affirmative action" in a case dealing with reasonable accommodation requests under
Title I of the ADA-that is, a challenge to the denial of a reasonable-accommodation
request or an appeal challenging the district court's finding that either a reasonable
accommodation was required under the ADA or that the employer was not under a statutory
duty to grant the reasonable-accommodation request.
The data set includes both published and unpublished opinions. Cases that were later
appealed or decided again on rehearing were counted as individual cases for each opinion
published or unpublished. Cases were also included even if they were subsequently
reversed.
Cases were included if they referenced the term "affirmative action" at least once and if
the term was employed to refer to either the denial of a reasonable-accommodation request
or to respond to rebuttals either by defense counsel or other courts that challenged the
accommodation partly on the grounds that the ADA is not an affirmative-action statute.
Given the politically charged nature of the words "affirmative action," only cases explicitly
stating "affirmative action"-and not cases that only referenced words like "preference" or
"special treatment '-were included in the data set. Admittedly, the data set is under-
inclusive as it would be difficult to capture all cases where affirmative action is floating in
the minds of judges in either granting-but most likely denying-a reasonable-
accommodation request.
Cases where the plaintiff incorporated "affirmative action" into his or her own legal
claims were excluded because the focus of the analysis is on the inclusion of the
affirmative-action analogy by courts. Similarly, if a defendant corporation incorporated the
term "affirmative action" into its defense, the case was excluded.
65 See infra Part III tbls.1-2.
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surge in cases referencing affirmative action after 1996 may have been
influenced by the Supreme Court's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.6 6 In J.A. Croson, the Supreme Court held that a minority set-
aside program established by the City of Richmond to support minority-
owned businesses was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause,
subjecting affirmative-action programs to strict scrutiny in the process. 67
As such, in the legal realm, the Supreme Court's opinion in J.A. Croson
may have ignited discussion on affirmative action and spurred efforts by
some courts to eliminate what it perceived as unjustified preferences, even
outside the race and sex context.68
Furthermore, by 1996, affirmative action was becoming an
exceedingly controversial and politically-charged issue, spurring statewide
referenda banning its use by public entities in states like California, which
enacted Proposition 209.69 Ultimately, the findings suggest that the use of
the "affirmative action" term in reasonable accommodation law surged at a
point when affirmative action was the source of considerable political and
social controversy.
At the district court level, a sizable proportion of opinions cite
Daugherty when referencing affirmative action,70 with EEOC v. Humiston-
Keeling7 following in a distant second.72 The problem with frequent
citations to the Daugherty opinion in particular will be discussed below.
For now, it is important to note that for the majority of cases
referencing affirmative action at the district court level, by the time the
opinion referenced affirmative action, the case had already been decided on
66 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
671 d. at 507-08, 511.
68 See, e.g., Jill B. Scott, Note, Will the Supreme Court Continue to Put Aside Local
Government Set-Asides as Unconstitutional?: The Search for an Answer in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 197, 229 (1990); L. Damell Weeden,
Affirmative Action California Style-Proposition 209: The Right Message While Avoiding a
Fatal Constitutional Attraction Because of Race and Sex, 21 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 281, 283
(1997).
69 Weeden, supra note 68, at 282.
70 See infra Part 1I1 tbl.3.
7' 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000).
72 See infra Part III tbl.3.
2018]
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
alternative grounds.7 3 In these cases, for example, the reviewing courts
had already determined that the individual with a disability was not
qualified or that the accommodation request constituted an undue burden.74
Furthermore, despite the decline in total references to affirmative
action over time, courts continue to cite some of the earliest cases-
namely, Daugherty and Turco-discussed in greater detail below.75 The
consistent references to these same few opinions over time suggest that
courts have not yet critically examined the use of affirmative action within
this body of law. Here again, it is important to note that the majority of
opinions citing to Daugherty at both the appellate and district court levels
do so in the course of denying a reasonable accommodation request.76
Although, as demonstrated below, not all definitions of affirmative action
indicate an unfavorable outcome for plaintiffs, references to either
Daugherty or Turco rarely bode well for the plaintiff.77
71 E.g., Bennett v. Calabrian Chems. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 2d 815, 838 (E.D. Tex. 2004);
Bettis v. Dep't of Human Servs., 70 F. Supp. 2d 865, 868 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
74 Bennett, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 840 ("Bennett has failed to show that he has a disability
cognizable under the ADA, that he has a record of such an impairment, or that he was
regarded as disabled in violation of the ADA."); Bettis, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 868 ("Defendant
was not required to place Plaintiff into the Stationary Fireman position as a 'reasonable
accommodation' because the ADA does not require Defendant to provide a promotion as an
accommodation.").
" See discussion infra Part V.
76 E.g., Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1026; Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 138 F.3d
1304, 1308-09 (10th Cir. 1998).
77 See infra Part IV.
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Table 1. Total Federal Courts of Appeals Cases Referencing the Term
"Affirmative Action" in ADA Reasonable Accommodation Cases
Date Range Total Cases
1990-1992 0
1993-1995 178
1996-1998 1079
1999-2001 780
2002-2004 181
2005-2007 382
2008-2010 283
2011-2013 184
2014-2016 185
2017 0
Total 26
78 Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995).
79 Midland Brake, 138 F.3d at 1309; Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090,
1094 (5th Cir. 1996); Malabarba v. Chi. Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 700 (7th Cir. 1998);
Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997); Aka v. Wash. Hosp.
Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir.
1998); Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996); Wernick v. Fed.
Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 385 (2d Cir. 1996); Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 196 F.3d
979, 983 (9th Cir. 1998); Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194, 1196
(7th Cir. 1997).
81 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1168 (10th Cir. 1999); Humiston-
Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1028; Williams v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 253 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir.
2001); Guerra v. UPS, Inc., 250 F.3d 739 (5th Cir. 2001); Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d
1105, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (Trott, J., dissenting); EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349,
354 (4th Cir. 2001); Hernandez v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 125 (5th Cir. 1999).
81 Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 459 (6th Cir. 2004).
82 Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 867 (7th Cir. 2005); Rehrs v.
lams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 358 (8th Cir. 2007); Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480,
483-84 (8th Cir. 2007).
83 Schneider v. Giant of Md., LLC, 389 F. App'x 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2010); Lors v.
Dean, 595 F.3d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 2010).
4 Toronka v. Confl Airlines, Inc., 411 F. App'x 719, 726 n.7 (5th Cir. 2011).
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Table 2. Total Federal District Court Cases Referencing the Term
"Affirmative Action" in ADA Reasonable Accommodation Cases
Date Range Total Cases
1990-1992 0
1993-1995 386
1996-1998 1687
1999-2001 1588
2002-2004 489
2005-2007 390
2008-2010 991
2011-2013 992
2014-2016 493
Total 63
85 EEOC v. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc., 842 F.3d 1333, 1346-47 (11 th Cir. 2016).
86 Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 397-98 (E.D. Tex. 1995);
Fussell v. Ga- Ports Auth., 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Turco v. Hoechst
Celanese Chem. Grp., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 1120, 1135-36 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
87 Andress v. Nat'l Pizza Co. Int'l, 984 F. Supp. 475, 486 (S.D. Miss. 1997); Taylor v.
Dover Elevator Sys., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 455, 463 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of
Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895, 901 (D. Ariz. 1997); Cannizzaro v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., 979 F.
Supp. 465, 475 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Daigre v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd., No. Civ. A. 96-0856,
1997 WL 16621, at *4 (E.D. La Jan. 16, 1997); Hunt v. Boyd Gaming Corp., No. Civ. A.
96-1909, 1997 WL 369617, at *7 (E.D. La. June 30, 1997); Vanderford v. Parker Hannifin
Corp., 971 F. Supp. 1079, 1080 (N.D. Miss. 1997); Gomez v. Am. Bldg. Maint., 940 F.
Supp. 255, 260 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Martinez v. Lennox Int'l, Inc., No. CIV.A.3:96-CV-0702,
1997 WL 209306, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 1997); Niece v. Fitzner, 941 F. Supp. 1497,
1509 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Nihiser v. Ohio EPA, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1174 (S.D. Ohio 1997);
Thorns v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1130 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Jackan v.
N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, No. 97-CV-0483, 1998 WL 760266, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 26,
1998); Rodriguez v. Roadway Express, Inc., No. CIV. A. L-96-11, 1997 WL 839014, at *6
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1997); Bowers v. NCAA, 974 F. Supp. 459, 466 (D.N.J. 1997); Newman
v. Chevron U.S.A., 979 F. Supp. 1085, 1091 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Ferguson v. Texasgulf, Inc.,
No. Civ. A. H-94-0710, 1996 WL 454987, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 1996).
88 Bettis v. Dep't of Human Servs., 70 F. Supp. 2d 865, 868 (C.D. 111. 1999); Felix v.
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Petty v. Freightliner
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Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 666, 668 (W.D.N.C. 2000); EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 54 F.
Supp. 2d 798, 813 (N.D. Il. 1999); Connolly v. Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., Inc., 56 F. Supp.
2d 360, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Ladenheim v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 225, 231
(D.P.R. 2000); Schwertfager v. City of Boynton Beach, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1356 (S.D.
Fla. 1999); Quick v. Tripp, Scott, Conklin & Smith, P.A., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1363 (S.D.
Fla. 1999); Petty v. Freightliner Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 979, 985 (W.D.N.C. 2000);
Hartsfield v. Miami-Dade Cty., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1375 (S.D. Fla- 2000); Pfeifer v.
Caterpillar Inc., No. 98 C 542, 2000 WL 310312, at *12 (N.D. 111. Mar. 24, 2000); Vinson
v. Grant/Riverside Methodist Hosps., No. C2-99-1358, 2001 WL 1681125, at *12-15 n.1 1
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2001); Aponte Diaz v. Navieras P.R., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254
(D.P.R. 2001); Khan v. Universal Imaging Sols., Inc., No. 99 CIV.10678 (BSJ), 2001 WL
1029408, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2001).
89 Alamo Rodriguez v. Pfizer Pharm., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 144, 162 (D.P.R. 2003);
Bennett v. Calabrian Chems. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 2d 815, 838 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Hines v.
Chrysler Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1050 (D. Colo. 2002); Swonke v. Sprint Inc., 327 F.
Supp. 2d 1128, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
9 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 04-2145, 2005 WL 3690679, at *4 (W.D. Ark.
Dec. 7, 2005); Stopka v. Med. Univ. of S.C., No. CIV.A. 2:05-1728-CWH, 2007 WL
2022188, at *12 (D.S.C. July 11, 2007); Willnerd v. First Nat'l of Neb., Inc., No.
805CV482, 2007 WL 2746866, at *14 (D. Neb. Sept. 19, 2007).
91 Jackson v. FUJIFILM Mfg. USA, Inc., No. CIV.A. 8:09-1328-RBH, 2010 WL
5778218, at *7 (D.S.C. June 18, 2010); Brown v. Kastle Sys. of Tex. LLC, No. CIV.A H-
08-02888, 2010 WL 3342219, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2010); McGregor v. United
Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. CIV.A. H-09-2340, 2010 WL 3082293, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Aug.
6, 2010); Haynes v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:09-CV-450, 2010 WL 5789050, at *9
(M.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2010); Walker v. Putnam Cty., Ga., No. 5:08-CV-00452 CAR, 2010
WL 3732111, at *8 (M.D. Ga Sept. 14, 2010); Garcia v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 3:08-CV-
02944, 2010 WL 4628627, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2010); Smith v. Shinseki, 716 F. Supp.
2d 556, 566 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Austin v. Bell S., No. CIV. A. 06-7464, 2008 WL 215565, at
*6 n. 11 (E.D. La Jan. 24, 2008); Woodruff v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., Fla., No. 606CV-
1937-ORL-22KRS, 2008 WL 786794, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2008).
' Franklin v. City of Slidell, 969 F. Supp. 2d 644, 655 (E.D. La 2013); Minnihan v.
Mediacom Commc'ns Corp., 987 F. Supp. 2d 918, 938 (S.D. Iowa 2013); Morton v. Cooper
Tire & Rubber Co., No. 1:12CV028-SA-DAS, 2013 WL 3088815, at *5 (N.D. Miss. June
18, 2013); Williams v. U.S. Servs., Inc., No. CIV.A. 2:10-1546-RMG, 2012 WL 590049, at
*7 (D.S.C. Jan. 31, 2012); Jackson v. FUJIFILM Mfg. USA, Inc., No. 8:09-CV-01328-
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Table 3. Total Courts of Appeals Cases Cited in Federal District Court
Opinions
Case Cited Total Citations94
DaugherVP5  5996
Turco97  1598
Terrell99 1110oo
Humiston-Keeling °1  7 102
Malabarba0 3  7 104
Huber'0 5  5 106
Wernick0 7  3108
Smith lo9  3110
Aka 1 1  1112
JMC, 2011 WL 494281, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 7, 2011); Montana v. Donahoe, No. EP-10-CV-
212-KC, 2011 WL 3862213, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2011); Marshall v. AT&T
Mobility, 793 F. Supp. 2d 761, 768 (D.S.C. 2011); Cmtys. Actively Living Indep. & Free v.
City of Los Angeles, No. CV 09-0287 CBM RZX, 2011 WL 4595993, at *14.(C.D. Cal.
Feb. 10, 2011); Allen v. Babcock & Wilcox Tech. Servs. Pantex, LLC, No. 2:12-CV-
00225-J, 2013 WL 5570192, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2013).
" United States v. Woody, 220 F. Supp. 3d 682, 688 (E.D. Va. 2016); MTC E. v. Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, No. 4:14-CV-175, 2015 WL 12698455, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 10,
2015); Moore v. CVS Rx Servs., Inc., 142 F. Supp. 3d 321, 341 (M.D. Pa. 2015);
Wilkerson v. Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-198, 2014 WL 5282242, at *8 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 15, 2014).
1 The total number includes cases that were cited in one opinion. For example, if
Daughtery and Humiston-Keeling were cited in one opinion, they were counted individually.
5 Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
6 Rodriguez v. Roadway Exp., Inc., No. CIV. A. L-96-11, 1997 WL 839014, at *6
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1997); Vanderford v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 971 F. Supp. 1079, 1080
(N.D. Miss. 1997); Hunt v. Boyd Gaming Corp., No. CIV.A. 96-1909, 1997 WL 369617, at
*7 (E.D. La- June 30, 1997); Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895, 900 (D.
Ariz. 1997); Pfeifer v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 98 C 542, 2000 WL 310312, at *12 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 24, 2000); Ladenheim v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 225, 231 (D.P.R. 2000);
Hartsfield v. Miami-Dade Cty., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Aponte Diaz v.
Navieras P.R., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254 (D.P.R. 2001); Alamo Rodriguez v. Pfizer
Pharm., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 144, 162 (D.P.R. 2003); Garcia v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 3:08-
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CV-02944, 2010 WL 4628627, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2010); Tyler v. La-Z-Boy Corp.,
No. 3:09-CV-688-WHB-LRA, 2011 WL 13134279, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 26, 2011);
Williams, 2012 WL 590049, at *7; Franklin, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 655; Morton, 2013 WL
3088815, at *5; EEOC v. McLeod Health, Inc., No. CV 4:14-3615-BHH, 2017 WL
4173601, at *8 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2017); Stockton v. Christus Health Se. Texas, No. 1:15-
CV-333, 2017 WL 1287550, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2017); MTC E. v. Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, No. 4:14-CV-175, 2015 WL 12698455, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 10,
2015); Pomerantz v. Houston Methodist Hosp., No. CIV.A. H-12-3479, 2014 WL 5090278,
at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014); Allen v. Babcock & Wilcox Tech. Servs. Pantex, LLC, No.
2:12-cv-00225-J, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146251, at *29 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2013); Andress
v. Nat'l Pizza Co. Int'l, 984 F. Supp. 475, 486 (S.D. Miss. 1997); Austin, 2008 WL 215565,
at *6 n.ll; Bennett v. Calabrian Chems. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 2d 815, 837 (E.D. Tex.2004);
Cannizzaro v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 465, 475 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Chollett v.
Patterson-UTI Drilling Servs., LP, No. V-08-27, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113113, at *34
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011); Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 98-0410-CV-W-2,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21874, at *17 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 18, 1999); Daigre v. Jefferson Par.
Sch. Bd., No. 96-0856 SECTION "N", 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 494, at *11 (E.D. La Jan.
15, 1997); Davis v. Chao, No. 06 C 1066, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32380, at *40 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 31, 2008); Davoll v. Webb, 943 F. Supp. 1289, 1300 (D. Colo. 1996); Diaz v.
Navieras P.R., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254 (D.P.R. 2001); EEOC v. Methodist Hosps. of
Dallas, No. 3:15-CV-3104-G, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33970, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9,
2017); Ellis v. Shannon Med. Ctr., No. 6:01 -CV-091-C, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20671, at
*13 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2002); F.F. v. City of Laredo, 912 F. Supp. 248, 253 (S.D. Tex.
1995); Felix v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Ferguson
v. Texasgulf, Inc., No. H-94-0710, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21922, at *34 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
12, 1996); Fussell v. Ga Ports Auth., 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Gomez v.
Am. Bldg. Maint., 940 F. Supp. 255, 260 (N.D. Cal.1996); Haynes, 2010 WL 5789050, at
*9; Jackan v. N.Y. State DOL, No. 97-CV-0483, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17202, at *35
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1998); Jackson, 2011 WL 494281, at *2; Johnson v. Equicom, Inc., No.
1:00-CV-249-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18032, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2001); Khan v.
Universal Imaging Sols., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10678 (BSJ), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13743, at
*23 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2001); Marshall v. AT&T Mobility, 793 F. Supp. 2d 761, 768
(D.S.C. 2011); Donahoe, 2011 WL 3862213, at *12; Newman v. Chevron U.S.A., 979 F.
Supp. 1085, 1088 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Preston v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., No. V-09-20,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69049, at *36 (S.D. Tex. July 12, 2010); Przybylak v. N.Y. State
Thruway Auth., No. 95-CV-0707E(F), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct.
(continued)
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15, 1997); Quick v. Tripp, Scott, Conklin & Smith, P.A., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1369 (S.D.
Fla. 1999); Rodriguez v. Pfizer Pharm., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 144, 162 (D.P.R. 2003);
Schwertfager v. City of Boynton Beach, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Taylor
v. Dover Elevator Sys., 917 F. Supp. 455, 463 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Thorns v. ABF Freight
Sys., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1130 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Chem.
Group, 906 F. Supp. 1120, 1129 (S.D. Tex. 1995); EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 54 F.
Supp. 2d 798, 812 (N.D. 11. 1999); Woody, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 694; Vinson v.
Grant/Riverside Methodist Hosps., No. C2-99-1358, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26372, at *35-
36 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2001); Walker, 2010 WL 3732111, at *8; Wilkerson, 2014 WL
5282242, at *7; Williams v. UPS, No. 2:i0-1546-RMG-BHH, 2012 U.S. Dist LEXIS
23079, at *22 (D.S.C. Jan. 31, 2012); Woodruff, 2008 WL 786794, at *8.
17 Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090 (5th Cir. 1996).
" Martinez v. Lennox Int'l, Inc., No. C1V.A.3:96-CV-0702-G, 1997 WL 209306, at *5
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 1997); Wohler, 2009 WL 4891942, at *3; EEOC v. Methodist Hosps.
of Dallas, No. 3:15-CV-3104-G, 2017 WL 930923, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2017); Bennett,
324 F. Supp. 2d at 837; Brown v. Kastle Sys. of Tex. LLC, No. H-08-02888, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 87641, at *42 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2010); Franklin v. City of Slidell, 969 F.
Supp. 2d 644, 653 (E.D. La. 2013); Hunt v. Boyd Gaming Corp., No. 96-1909 SECTION
"D" (4), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9361, at *18 (E.D. La. June 30, 1997); Kallail v. Alliant
Energy Corp. Servs., No. C10-0063, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51705, at *48 (N.D. Iowa May
13, 2011); McGregor v. United Healthcare Servs., No. H-09-2340, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79521, at *24 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2010); Montana v. Donahoe, No. EP-10-CV-212-KC,
2011, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98814, at *34 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2011); Newman v. Chevron
U.S.A., 979 F. Supp. 1085, 1091 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Rodriguez v. Roadway Express, No. L-
96-11, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22075, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1997); Smith v. Shinseki,
716 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Thoms v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F. Supp.
2d 1119, 1130 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Wilkerson v. Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-198,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146695, at *20 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2014).
9 Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621 (11 th Cir. 1998).
'0°Felix, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 662; Marshall, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 784; Bennett, 324 F.
Supp. 2d at 837; Garcia, 2010 WL 4628627, at *6; Hartsfield, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 1371;
Jackson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13426, at *4; Quick, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1363; Schwertfager,
42 F. Supp. 2d at 1356; Walker, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95593, at *21; Wohler v. St.
Tammany Par. Sch. Bd., 2009 WL 4891942, at *3 n.9 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 2009); Woodruff,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22179, at *20.
101 EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000).
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102 Castro-Medina v. Procter & Gamble Commercial Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d 343, 374
(D.P.R. 2008); Jackson v. FUJIF1LM Mfg. USA, Inc., No. CIV.A. 8:09-1328-RBH, 2010
WL 5778218, at *7 (D.S.C. June 18, 2010); Woody, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 693; McLeod
Health, 2017 WL 4173601, at *8 n.3; Garcia, 2010 WL 4628627, at *6 n.3; Haynes, 2010
WL 5789050, at *9; Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 04-2145, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
40251, at *8 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 7, 2005); Petty v. Freightliner Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 666,
668 (W.D.N.C. 2000); Petty v. Freightliner Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 979, 985 (W.D.N.C.
2000); Vinson, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26372, at *28.
103 Malabarba v. Chi. Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 1998).
1o4Pfeifer v. Caterpillar Inc., No. 98 C 542, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5733, at *20 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 23, 2000); Alitovski v. Elgin Corrugated Box Co., No. 99 C 5018, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2070, at *16 (N.D. 111. Feb. 21, 2001); Jackan v. N.Y. State DOL, No. 97-CV-0483,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17202, at *36 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1998); Ladenheim v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 225, 231 (D.P.R. 2000); Bettis v. Dep't of Human Servs., 70
F. Supp. 2d 865, 868 (C.D. 111.1999); K.P. v. City of Chicago, No. 14 C 7296, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 146082, at *25 (N.D. 111. Oct. 14, 2014); EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 54
F. Supp. 2d 798, 816 (N.D. I11. 999).
105 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007).
1 6 Haynes v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:09-CV-450, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141104,
at *27 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2010); EEOC v. McLeod Health, Inc., No. 4:14-3615-BHH,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154156, at *23 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2017); Jackson, 2011 WL 494281,
at *2; Willnerd v. First Nat'l of Neb., Inc., No. 8:05CV482, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69837,
at *36 (D. Neb. Sept. 19, 2007); Marshall v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 793 F. Supp. 2d 761,
784 (D.S.C. 2011).
107 Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1996).
108 Marshall, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 784; Khan v. Universal Imaging Sols., Inc., No. 99
CIV.10678 (BSJ), 2001 WL 1029408, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2001); Cravens v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, No. 98-0410-CV-W-2, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21874, at *17 (W.D.
Mo. Mar. 18, 1999).
" Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
110 Bennett v. Henderson, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 (D. Kan. 1998); Jackan v. N.Y.
State DOL, No. 97-CV-0483, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17202, at *36 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 23,
1998); Jackson v. FUJIFILM Mfg. USA, Inc., No. CIV.A. 8:09-1328-RBH, 2010 WL
5778218, at *7 (D.S.C. June 18, 2010).
.. Akav. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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IV. DEFINITIONS OF "AFFIRMATIVE ACTION" EMPLOYED BY COURTS
As noted above, there are several competing and conflicting definitions
of affirmative action at play in court opinions within the reasonable-
accommodation context. Even the Supreme Court in the Davis case,
referenced above as one of the first cases employing the affirmative-action
analogy in the disability law context, clarified its use of the term in a later
opinion.113 Within the reasonable-accommodation context, there are five
definitions of affirmative action found within the court opinions examined:
(1) the neutral definition;" 4 (2) the lack of qualifications definition;"1 5
(3) the fundamental alteration definition;.. 6 (4) the preferential treatment
defimition;" 7 and (5) the removal of structural barriers definition.!" Each
of these definitions is described in greater detail below. These definitions
can be found within the reasonable-accommodation opinions that reference
affirmative action; 1 9 in some opinions, more than one definition is
discussed.12 This Part attempts to catalogue the various definitions of
affirmative action to demonstrate the complexity of the term within the
reasonable-accommodation context.
A. The Neutral Definition
References to affirmative action often conjure up terms such as
"preference," "special treatment," or other politically-charged terminology
from the race- and-sex-based context. 21  The earliest references to
affirmative action, however, reflected a more neutral connotation. 22 The
neutral definition of affirmative action refers to any affirmative step that an
112 Haynes v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:09-CV-450, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141104,
at *29 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2010).
13 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300-01 n.20 (1985).
114 See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 619 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
... See, e.g., Malabarba v. Chi. Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1998).
116 See, e.g., Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982).
117 See, e.g., Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995).
118 See, e.g., Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895, 901 (D. Ariz. 1997).
19 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 114-18.
2
' See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400-01, 406 (2002).
121 E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978).
122 E.g., Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401.
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employer must take to ensure that disabled employees have the opportunity
to integrate into the workforce. One of the earliest references to
affirmative action is found in Executive Order 11246, which referred to
affirmative action to describe the duties of government contractors and
subcontractors in ensuring nondiscrimination in employment.
123
The Supreme Court has also embraced the neutral definition of
affirmative action within the disability law context.124 In US. Airways,
Inc., v. Barnett, Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, affirmed that the
ADA's statutory objectives "will sometimes require affirmative conduct to
promote entry of disabled people into the workforce."' 25 Similar examples
of the neutral definition can be found in lower court opinions within the
reasonable-accommodation context.
126
123 Executive Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319, 12320 (Sept. 28, 1965) ("The
contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that
employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or
national origin.").
124 E.g., Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 619 (1999) ("Therefore, '[a] comparison of
these provisions demonstrates that Congress understood accommodation of the needs of
handicapped individuals may require affirmative action and knew how to provide for it in
those instances where it wished to do so."') (alteration in original) (quoting Se. Cmty. Coll.
v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979)).
125 535 U.S. at 401 (emphasis added).
126 See, e.g., Hines v. Chrysler Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1050 (D. Colo. 2002)
(arguing that in Smith, the Tenth Circuit required affirmative action, where affirmative
action refers to an active effort on the part of the employer); Williams v. Wasserman, 937 F.
Supp. 524, 528 n.4 (D. Md. 1996) (discussing Davis and the clarification made in
Alexander v. Choate); Schwarz v. Nw. Iowa Cmty. Coll., 881 F. Supp. 1323, 1345 (N.D.
Iowa 1995) ("However, a request that an employer maintain the status quo for schedules or
other working conditions may amount to a showing that the status quo is a possible and
reasonable accommodation. Admittedly, reasonable accommodations usually require some
affirmative action on the part of the employer."). But see Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d
644, 651 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Davis concluded that Congress had understood 'the distinction
between the evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped persons and affirmative efforts
to overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps,' and plainly had not intended 'to impose
an affirmative-action obligation on all recipients of federal funds' when it enacted section
504.") (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 410-11); Alamo Rodriguez v. Pfizer Pharm., Inc., 286 F.
(continued)
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At its core, the neutral definition recognizes that employers have an
active duty under the ADA to take affirmative steps to ensure the
integration of disabled employees into the workforce.127 Notably, the
neutral definition of affirmative action embraces the difference model of
equality, as discussed above, and embeds within the statute a requirement
that employers treat disabled individuals differently from nondisabled
individuals by, for example, incurring costs to provide reasonable
accommodations like ergonomic chairs, flexible work hours, or reduced
physical demands.' z
B. Lack of Qualifications
As noted above, the ADA requires employers to provide reasonable
accommodations to qualified individuals unless the accommodation
imposes an undue burden. 29 Imbedded within the statute, therefore, is a
limitation on the scope of a disabled employee's right to a reasonable
accommodation. 30 To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the
employee requesting the accommodation must establish that he or she "(1)
has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, (2) is a qualified
individual, and (3) suffered an adverse employment action as a result of the
disability.' 131 Under the ADA, a qualified individual with a disability must
"(1) possess the requisite skill, education, experience, and training for h[is]
Supp. 2d 144, 162 (D.P.R. 2003) ("However, although the employer has the affirmative
duty to transfer the employee to a vacant position, ADA is not read as to require affirmative
action in favor of individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring disabled persons be
given priority in hiring or reassignment over those who are not disabled.").
127See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("To begin with
the statutory text, the word 'reassign' must mean more than allowing an employee to apply
for a job on the same basis as anyone else. An employee who on his own initiative applies
for and obtains a job elsewhere in the enterprise would not be described as having been
'reassigned'; the core word 'assign' implies some active effort on the part of the
employer.").
12842 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (2017).
129 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
130 See id.
131 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 482 (8th Cir. 2007) (footnote
omitted).
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position, and (2) be able to perform the essential job functions, with or
without reasonable accommodation." '132 Once the plaintiff-employee has
made the required showing, in order to survive summary judgment, the
plaintiff must also "show that an 'accommodation' seems reasonable on its
face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases." '133 At that point, the defendant-
employer "must show special (typically case-specific) circumstances that
demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances."' 13 4 The ADA
provides a list of factors that the court may utilize to determine whether the
reasonable accommodation imposes an undue hardship, including but not
limited to the nature and cost of the accommodation, the overall financial
resources of the employer, and the size of the business.'35
Given the elaborate burden-shifting framework that is available, and
the fact that the analysis hinges on reasonableness, it is particularly
perplexing to find the language of affirmative action within this subset of
opinions. After all, if the court determines that the accommodation poses
an undue burden or is not reasonable on its face, the inquiry ends-the
accommodation is therefore unreasonable. 136  Nonetheless, some courts
have employed the term "affirmative action" to refer to accommodation
requests that the particular court deems patently unreasonable given the
individual's lack of qualifications. 137 These opinions often turn on factors
132 Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E.R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 2003) (alteration
in original) (quoting Heaser v. Toro Co., 247 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2001)).
113 U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002).
134 Id. at 402.
135 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2012).
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
137 E.g., Malabarba v. Chi. Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1998)
(upholding district court's finding that plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a
disability) ("In our view, these suggested accommodations are unreasonable; each one
would have saddled the Tribune with a duty that is not compelled by the
ADA.... Restated, the ADA does not mandate a policy of 'affirmative action in favor of
individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring that disabled person be given priority
in hiring or reassignment over those who are not disabled."') (quoting Daugherty v. City of
El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995)); Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d
852, 867 (7th Cir. 2005); Khan v. Universal Imaging Sols., Inc., No. 99 CIV.10678 (BSJ),
2001 WL 1029408, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2001) ("In addition, defendant has shown that
(continued)
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separate from the nature of the accommodation itself. For example, in
court opinions that refer to affirmative action to demonstrate the
unreasonableness of an accommodation request, the plaintiff is usually an
unqualified individual with a disability seeking a request that is not
designated for other nondisabled employees.1 38  In these cases, the
unreasonableness of the accommodation inheres in the fact that the
individual lacked the ability to perform the essential functions of the job
with or without the accommodation.1 39  The use of affirmative action in
these opinions suggests a defiition of affirmative action that is indeed
troubling because it suggests that the provision of benefits accrues to
individuals who wholly lack qualifications for the position. 4 '
C. Fundamental Alteration
Employers are not required to alter the essential functions of the job in
question in order to accommodate individuals with disabilities. 41 In these
such an accommodation is unreasonable. Plaintiffs disability does not qualify him to some
form of affirmative action over other, nondisabled employees.").
138 E.g., Toronka v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 411 Fed. App'x 719, 726 (5th Cir. 2011)
(affirming summary judgment against plaintiff where plaintiff was not qualified for any of
the positions available at his employer) ("It is not an employer's responsibility to 'fashion' a
new job, as Toronka asserts. For reassignment to be a reasonable accommodation, a
position 'must first exist and be vacant."') (quoting Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d
615, 621 (5th Cir. 1999)); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.
1997) (finding that plaintiff was not disabled under the ADA, plaintiff lacked qualifications
for reassignment, and plaintiff's accommodation request was unreasonable); Turco v.
Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1093 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiff was not
a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA).
139 See, e.g., Toronka, 411 Fed. App'x at 724-25; Foreman, 117 F.3d at 809; Turco,
101 F.3d at 1093.
1
"See, e.g., Toronka, 411 Fed. App'x at 724-25; Foreman, 117 F.3d at 809; Turco,
101 F.3d at 1093. It should be noted that these opinions tend to argue that the
accommodation is unreasonable based on the finding that the accommodation constitutes
preferential treatment. What distinguishes this definition from the preferential treatment
definition is that plaintiff is not found to be a qualified individual with a disability in these
cases.
141 EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 764 (6th Cir. 2015).
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cases, affirmative action refers to perceived attempts to fundamentally alter
the employer's hiring program or policies or modify the essential functions
of the particular position sought by the disabled employee. 14 2 In contrast to
the structural definition of affirmative action described below, the
fundamental alteration definition suggests a negative connotation.
Frequently, these accommodation requests are portrayed as requiring the
employer to substantially reconfigure its core human resource policies,
including hiring procedures, reassignment protocols, or organizational
structures.
143
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate referred to
the fundamental alteration definition of affirmative action in clarifying its
use of the term:
In Davis, we stated that § 504 does not impose an
"affirmative-action obligation on all recipients of federal
funds."... [I]t is clear from the context of Davis that the
term "affirmative action" referred to those "changes,"
"adjustments," or "modifications" to existing programs
that would be "substantial," or that would constitute
"fundamental alteration[s] in the nature of a
program"... rather than to those changes that would be
reasonable accommodations.'44
Here, the Court defined affirmative action as a substantial change that
would require a fundamental alteration in the employer's existing
programs and policies. 45  Similarly, court opinions employing the
142 E.g., Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982).
143 Employers are not required to fundamentally alter their hiring and reassignment
procedures if such changes would impose an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
(2012). However, short of that, the employer may be required to change processes and
procedures if it is determined that they operate in a discriminatory fashion. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (2017). In short, some reasonable accommodation requests may
be fundamental yet reasonable.
" Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300-01 n.20 (1985) (citations omitted) (quoting
Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979)). See also Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d
325, 337 (3d Cir. 1995).
145 Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300-01 n.20.
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fundamental alteration language reference affirmative action when the
accommodation request is viewed as a mandate requiring the employer to
lower its standards for job performance for a particular position. 46
Under the ADA, employers are not required to create new positions for
employees with disabilities. Rather, employers must assign these
employees to vacant positions if the employee is able to complete the
essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation
and if the employer can provide the accommodation without undue
burden. 147  In this realm, references to affirmative action also appear in
cases where courts find that only the creation of a new position would
accommodate the employee.
1 41
D. Preferential Treatment
As will be demonstrated in the next Part, the majority of courts
employing the affirmative-action analogy in the reasonable-
accommodation context do so based on the preferential treatment 149
"4See, e.g., Austin v. Bell S., No. 06-7464, 2008 WL 215565, at *68 n.lI (E.D. La.
Jan. 24, 2008) (quoting Daugherty for the proposition that employers are not required to
fundamentally alter their hiring programs) ("Employers are not required to create light duty
jobs to accommodate disabled employees.... As the Fifth Circuit has noted, the law does
not 'requir[e] affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities[; rather it] prohibits
employment discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities, no more and no
less."').
147 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 1999) ("However,
the legislative history clearly distinguishes between the affirmative action of modifying the
essential functions of a job (which is not required) and the duty to reassign a disabled
person to an existing vacant job, if necessary to enable the disabled person to keep his or
her employment with the company (which is required)."); Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford
Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 398 (E.D. Tex. 1995) ("Moreover, the ADA does not require that an
employer substantially modify its operations in order to ensure every disabled individual the
benefits of employment.").
14 8 E.g., Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996).
149 Within the preferential treatment context, it is assumed that modifications to
employment criteria will be applied only to disabled individuals and not to individuals
without disabilities. Of course, employers could alter standards for all employees, but by
(continued)
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definition of affirmative action. 5 ' In these opinions, particular
accommodation requests are regarded as requiring preferential treatment to
the benefit of the disabled employee at the expense of the nondisabled
employees. 5 ' Because the ADA does not require "mandatory
preference"' 52 but only mandates nondiscrimination, as the argument
proceeds, the accommodation request must be denied.'53 These opinions
emphasize equal opportunity as required by the ADA and focus their
inquiry on whether disabled employees are provided the same
opportunities as nondisabled employees. In short, these courts view the
ADA as merely "prohibit[ing] employment discrimination against
qualified individuals with disabilities, no more and no less."'
' 54
The preferential-treatment argument takes many forms and is applied
to a variety of contexts within reasonable-accommodation case law. Each
version of the preferential-treatment argument is described in greater detail
below.
1. No Preference for Disabled Employees
Opinions adhering to the preferential-treatment definition of
affirmative action emphasize that the ADA does not require employers to
doing so the employer would not be showing a preference to the disabled employee on the
basis of their disability.
150 Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation Under the,
Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 994 (2004).
151 Alex B. Long, The ADA 's Reasonable Accommodation Requirement and "Innocent
Third Parties", 68 Mo. L. REV. 863, 899.
152 EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing cases
holding that the "Americans with Disabilities Act is not a mandatory preference act").
153 Id. at 1028-29.
154 Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir.1995). See also Wemick v.
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Congress intended simply
that disabled persons have the same opportunities available to them as are available to
nondisabled persons."); Rebecca Mastrangela, Comment, Does the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 Impose an Undue Burden on Employers?, 32 DuQ. L. REV. 269,
270 (1994) ("The ADA does not require affirmative action on the part of employers. It is
intended only to enable disabled persons to compete in the workplace based on the same
performance standards as nondisabled persons.").
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adopt preferences for disabled applicants or employees when making
employment decisions. Stated succinctly, employers are not required to
give preferences to disabled individuals over nondisabled individuals.'55
Courts adopting this perspective argue that the legislative history of the
ADA supports this principle. 15 6 According to courts adhering to this view,
such preferences would constitute affirmative action.157
Reassignment decisions are by far the most controversial, and they
frequently invoke references to affirmative action based on preferential
treatment. 158 Under the ADA, reassignment to vacant positions is included
within the scope of possible reasonable accommodations.1 59
Reassigning employees to vacant positions may conflict with
collective bargaining agreements, seniority systems, or legitimate
nondiscriminatory employment policies. In Barnett, the Supreme Court
held that reassignment requests that require the employer to violate a
legitimate and consistently enforced seniority policy "ordinarily... [will]
not require... [re]assignment."'" However, the Court granted the
opportunity for plaintiffs to demonstrate "special circumstances [that]
warrant a finding that, despite the presence of a seniority system (which
the ADA may not trump in the run of cases), the requested
'accommodation' is 'reasonable' on the particular facts."'161 Outside the
seniority context, courts have held that the ADA does not require
155 Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700.
116 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 56 ("In other words, the employer's obligation
is to consider applicants and make decisions without regard to an individual's disability, or
the individual's need for a reasonable accommodation. But, the employer has no obligation
under this legislation to prefer applicants with disabilities over other applicants on the basis
of disability."). But see Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
("Numerous courts have assumed that the reassignment obligation means something more
than treating a disabled employee like any other job applicant.").
117 See Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700 ("[W]e do not read the ADA as requiring affirmative
action in favor of individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring that disabled
persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment over those who are not disabled.").
158 Ball, supra note 150, at 958.
159 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2012).
16 U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002).
161 Id. at 405.
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reassignment in violation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy.1 62 One
court emphasized that such a requirement would constitute affirmative
163action.
Similarly, courts addressing the question of whether disabled
employees who are qualified but not the most qualified should receive a
preference in filling vacant positions frequently reference the term
"affirmative action."'" Courts adhering to this view argue that, in terms of
qualifications, minimally-or unqualified--disabled employees should not
"beat out" a more qualified nondisabled employee in hiring or
reassignment decisions. 16 As one court emphatically stated:
[T]here is a difference, one of principle and not merely of
cost, between requiring employers to clear away obstacles
to hiring the best applicant for a job, who might be a
disabled person or a member of some other statutorily
protected group, and requiring employers to hire inferior
(albeit minimally qualified) applicants merely because
they are members of such a group. That is affirmative
action with a vengeance. That is giving a job to someone
solely on the basis of his status as a member of a
statutorily protected group. It goes well beyond enabling
the disabled applicant to compete in the workplace, or
62E.g., Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007).
163 Id. at 484.
164 E.g., EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 2000).
165 E.g, Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Henderson, J.,
dissenting) ("As explained earlier, [Akal did not [prove to be the more qualified candidate
for the job]. Washington Hospital was under no duty to afford Aka a hiring preference-
because of his disability-over a more qualified, non-disabled applicant."); Wemick v. Fed.
Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Contrary to the suggestion by
Wemick's counsel in his brief and at oral argument, the Fed did not have an affirmative
duty to provide Wernick with a job for which she was qualified; the Fed only had an
obligation to treat her in the same manner that it treated other similarly qualified
candidates.").
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requiring the employer to rectify a situation (such as lack
of wheelchair access) that is of his own doing."6
These courts have emphasized that for both applicants and employees,
preferences for disabled individuals are impermissible under the
antidiscrimination aims of the ADA. 167  As noted earlier, however, the
legislative history suggests that Congress only expressly acknowledged
that preferences for applicants were not required.1 68 Given that, the debate
surrounding this particular issue rages on in the courts.
16 9
2. No "Special" Treatment for Disabled Employees
Court opinions often refer to affirmative action to express disapproval
of reasonable-accommodation requests that appear to grant disabled
166 Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1028-29 (emphasis added). See also Jackson v.
Fujifilm Mfg. USA, Inc., No. 8:09-cv-01328-JMC, 2011 WL 494281, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 7,
2011) ("The Fourth Circuit has not addressed whether the ADA requires an employer, as a
reasonable accommodation, to give a current disabled employee preference in filling a
vacant position when the employee is able to perform the job duties, but is not the most
qualified candidate. However, most of the circuits... have found that the ADA is not an
affirmative action statute and does not require such action."). But see Stephen F. Befort,
The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues: Reassignment and Leave of
Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 469 (2002) ("Although affirmative action rhetoric
has clouded this debate, the ADA's central purpose of helping disabled individuals to
participate fully in the American workplace supports preferring the reassignment rights of
the disabled employee.") (footnote omitted).
167 E.g., Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1028.
168 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 56 (1990).
169 See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1168 (10th Cir. 1999)
("However, the legislative history clearly distinguishes between the affirmative action of
modifying the essential functions of a job (which is not required) and the duty to reassign a
disabled person to an existing vacant job, if necessary to enable the disabled person to keep
his or her employment with the company (which is required)."); Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304
(citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 56) ("Although the ADA's legislative history does
warn against 'preferences' for disabled applicants, it also makes clear that reasonable
accommodations for existing employees who become disabled on the job do not fall within
that ban.").
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employees some form of special treatment.17° Special treatment'71 may
take many forms but may include providing disabled employees with
additional privileges or perks compared with nondisabled employees. For
example, as one federal district court opined, "[A] disabled employee has
not earned the right to pick among reasonable accommodations because he
would thereby gain greater rights than his nondisabled coworkers. Any
other approach would require affirmative action on behalf of disabled
employees at the expense of the nondisabled." '172 In another reasonable-
accommodation case, the Seventh Circuit rejected a request by a disabled
employee to receive training from her employer to make her eligible for a
position as sales manager.173 Rejecting the plaintiff's request, the court
reasoned as follows:
If all [the plaintiff] wanted was an opportunity to compete
for the job by enrolling in a training program offered to
aspirants for sales manager positions, the employer could
not refuse her on the ground that she was disabled unless
her disability prevented her from participating in the
program or serving in the job for which it is designed to
qualify participants. But our plaintiff is seeking special
training, not offered to nondisabled employees, to enable
her to qualify. The Americans with Disabilities Act does
not require employers to offer special training to disabled
employees. It is not an affirmative action statute in the
sense of requiring an employer to give preferential
treatment to a disabled employee merely on account of the
employee's disability .... "'
170 See, e.g., Walker v. Putnam Cty., No. 5:08-CV-00452 (CAR), 2010 WL 3732111, at
*8 (M.D. Ga Sept. 14, 2010).
171 Special treatment may also refer to preferences in hiring, for example. Here, special
treatment, in terms of preferences in hiring or reassignment, is distinguished from special
treatment in terms of job-specific privileges, perks, or exemptions.
172 Walker, 2010 WL 3732111, at *8.
173 Williams v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 253 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 2001).
174 Id. (citations omitted). See also Rehrs v. Jams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 358 (8th Cir.
2007) ("Here, P & G required all employees in Rehrs's position to rotate shifts. Such a
(continued)
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The Seventh Circuit continued by emphasizing the burden to employers if
such special treatment were afforded to disabled employees:
The burden that would be placed on employers if disabled
persons could demand special training to fit them for new
jobs would be excessive and is not envisaged or required
by the Act. The duty of reasonable accommodation may
require the employer to reconfigure the workplace to
enable a disabled worker to cope with her disability, but it
does not require the employer to reconfigure the disabled
worker. A blind person cannot insist that her employer
teach her Braille, though she may be able to insist that her
employer provide certain signage in Braille to enable her
to navigate the workplace.' 75
As the Williams opinion demonstrates, the unfairness of special treatment
inheres not only in the so-called "greater rights" afforded to disabled
individuals but also in attempts by individuals to obtain access to
resources. Such resources may be available to nondisabled employees but
remain disconnected from disability-related limitations on their ability to
perform the job. In addition, affirmative action is referenced in cases
where the requested accommodation is viewed as requiring less strenuous
or less demanding essential job functions. 176 As one court made clear,
even individualized supervision could render a reasonable accommodation
request a form of preferential treatment:
To be sure, the ADA does not require an employer to
accommodate a disabled employee by making special,
individualized training or supervision available in order to
shepherd that employee through what is an essential and
generally applicable requirement was not discriminatory. The ADA does not require P & G
to create a new straight shift position for Rehrs.").
175 Williams, 253 F.3d at 282-83.
176E.g., Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996)
("Additionally, Hoechst is not required to create light duty jobs to accommodate disabled
employees.").
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legitimate requirement of the job.... [L]et us make clear
that the ADA 'is not an affirmative action statute .... 177
The tone of this subset of cases reveals that in most cases, special
treatment serves as a proxy for requiring employers to lower their
standards. Yet within the undue burden or reasonableness inquiry, courts
should be able to decipher whether a particular accommodation request
mandates that an employer lower its performance standards and
expectations for disabled employees. Here, the affirmative-action
reference seems especially superfluous.
3. Third-Party Harms
Opinions advancing the preferential treatment argument may also
reference the possibility of third-party harms as a result of a particular
accommodation request-in most cases, a reassignment to a vacant
position.17 ' In particular, references to affirmative action tend to appear in
cases involving a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy, such as a seniority
system or a policy of hiring the most qualified candidate for the job.1 79
Most courts express strong reservations about pummeling the rights of
third parties through accommodations that subvert the policies set in place
by a legitimate and nondiscriminatory policy. 8° A passage from a Fourth
Circuit opinion reflects this overall reservation:
The difference in this case is that requiring an employer to
break a legitimate and non-discriminatory policy tramples
on the rights of other employees as well. The ADA does
not require employers to penalize employees free from
disability in order to vindicate the rights of disabled
workers.... The ADA does not require reassignment
when it would mandate that the employer bump another
employee out of a particular position. Rather, an employer
must be able to treat a disabled employee as it would any
177 Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Williams, 253 F.3d at 282).
178 E.g., EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2001).
179 E.g., id.
180 E.g., id.
2018]
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
other worker when the company operates a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory policy. A "contrary rule would convert
a nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory preference
statute, a result which would be both inconsistent with the
nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA and an unreasonable
imposition on the employers and coworkers of disabled
employees."' 8 1
In these cases, if the employer has a legitimate nondiscriminatory
policy and consistently enforces that policy, it can defend against a charge
of discrimination, alleging, for example, the failure to reassign.182 For
example, the employer could demonstrate that the disabled employee was
treated no differently from nondisabled employees in the operation of that
particular legitimate and nondiscriminatory reassignment policy. 83
E. Removal of Structural Barriers
The structural-barriers definition of affirmative action focuses on the
removal of barriers that hinder individuals with disabilities from equal
access to employment opportunities."8  Cases adopting the structural-
barriers definition of affirmative action are few and far between. Despite
their rarity, these cases reflect a firm commitment to ensuring that disabled
individuals compete on a level playing field and that employers engage in
active efforts to level that playing field by enabling the otherwise qualified
employee to perform the job. As one court stated:
[T]hese provisions do not render the ADA an affirmative
action program, but serve as a method of leveling the
181 Id. (quoting Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir. 1998)).
182 E.g., id.
183 See id.
184 See Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of
Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action
Debate, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 4 (1994) ("Our central thesis is that affirmative
action is not a matter of affording 'preferential treatment' to its beneficiaries, but instead an
attempt to offer them greater equality of opportunity in a social context marked by
pervasive inequalities, one in which many institutional practices work to impede a fair
assessment of the capabilities of those who are working class, women, or people of color.").
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playing field between disabled and nondisabled
employees, in the sense of enabling a disabled worker to
do the job without creating undue hardship on the
employer. In addition to providing individuals with
disabilities an equal opportunity to pursue employment
opportunities, the purpose of the ADA is to reduce societal
costs of dependency and nonproductivity.185
The structural definition of affirmative action allows (or has the
potential to allow) for more robust reasonable-accommodation claims
when the scope of affirmative action is taken to its logical conclusion. Of
course, courts must also take into account the reasonableness of the request
and the undue-burden inquiry. At the core of the structural definition of
affirmative action is a firm commitment to ensuring that employers take an
active role in integrating individuals with disabilities into their work
places. 86 Here, active efforts are required to eliminate the blatant and
implicit forms of discrimination that function to exclude disabled
individuals from the work force.1
87
V. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION:
DECIPHERING MEANING
As noted above, there are several definitions of affirmative action
present in cases within the reasonable-accommodation context. Some
definitions, such as the neutral and structural definition, serve as a proxy
for the employer's duty-limited only by the undue-burden analysis, and
in some cases, the overall reasonableness of the request.1 88  Other
references to affirmative action are included to suggest the
unreasonableness of the request itself or the unreasonableness of the
request vis-A-vis the effects on other employees. 9 Although these various
185 Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895, 901 (D. Ariz. 1997) (granting
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment).
186 See Cooper, supra note 54, at 1430.
187 Id. at 1427-28.
188 See Williams v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 253 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 2001); Hammel
v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 867 (7th Cir. 2005).
189 See EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2001); Walker v. Putnam
County, No. 5:08-CV-00452, 2010 WL 3732111, at *8 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2010).
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definitions exist, there is little to no recognition by the courts referencing
affirmative action in the reasonable-accommodation context that the
multiple definitions of affirmative action may obscure the term's meaning
across opinions. Given that, court citations to opinions referencing
affirmative action that fail to recognize the differing contexts and
definitions reduce the persuasiveness of the affirmative-action analogy.
These two issues will be discussed in this Part to demonstrate that the
affirmative-action analogy is often misplaced and rarely accompanied by
analysis sufficient to justify its use in the reasonable-accommodation
context.
A. References to the Affirmative-Action Analogy are Misplaced and Rarely
Accompanied by Sufficient Analysis
Courts in a variety of contexts have referenced the affirmative-action
analogy.' Although the contexts may vary considerably, the same few
cases-and by and large one case-are consistently cited, and frequently
without acknowledging either the different context or the different
definitions of affirmative action.' In the vast majority of court opinions,
references to affirmative action were cited as fleeting references in the
course of denying reasonable-accommodation claims.' 92 For example, a
number of district court opinions referenced affirmative action-frequently
citing to the Daugherty opinion or Humiston-Keeling-with little to no
analysis justifying its inclusion in a discussion in the context of reasonable
accommodation.' 93
A problem arises when the specific context in which the affirmative-
action analogy is utilized is expanded beyond its intended scope. The
justification of the affirmative-action analogy is very much built on the
particular definition of affirmative action, but because there are several
competing and conflicting definitions of affirmative action, a court's use of
the term in one context will be based on the particular facts of the case. As
such, expanding the analogy beyond the particular facts and context risks
incorporating into reasonable accommodation opinions a term that may
See supra Part III tbls. 1-2.
'9' See supra Part III tbl. 3.
192 E.g., EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 2000).
' See supra Part III tbl. 3.
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carry more political controversy than actual relevance. 194 In some cases,
the term refers to the affirmative obligations of employers,1 95 while in other
cases, the term refers to an illegitimate preference not supported by the
statute.1 96 Ultimately, at a global level, the failure to distinguish between
contexts and definitional frames adds confusion to the reasonable-
accommodation case law.
Daugherty regarded the plaintiffs reassignment request as requiring
nothing less than a "fundamental alteration" of the City's existing hiring
policy.1 97 To the extent that the City was required to assign the plaintiff to
full-time positions, such a reassignment would indeed require a
fundamental alteration or subversion of existing City policy.'
98
Furthermore, accepting the City's claim that it made good-faith efforts to
inform Daugherty of available openings within the City, the plaintiff's lack
of qualifications made it difficult to compete for these positions.' 99
Finding that the City had no duty to accommodate, the Fifth Circuit held
that, in order for the plaintiffs claim to survive, he had to demonstrate he
was treated differently from other employees."' 0 As the court noted:
Even viewing all the disputed evidence in favor of
Daugherty, his ADA claim must fail because he did not
show that he was treated differently from any other part-
time employee whose job was eliminated. ... There was
no proof that the city treated him worse than it treated any
other displaced employee.20 1
194See, e.g., Quick v. Tripp, Scott, Conklin & Smith, P.A., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1363
(S.D. Fla. 1999) (affirmative action cited under section discussing the "purposes" of the
ADA) ("The statute was not designed to give disabled persons the power to invoke
affirmative action ....").
195 E.g., Hines v. Chrysler Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1050 (D. Colo. 2002).
196 E.g., Quick, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1363.
197 Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 699.
200 ld. at 700.
201 d
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Given the existence of the City's hiring policy and the plaintiff's lack of
qualifications, the court's conclusion implies that nothing short of
affirmative action would require the employer to reassign Daugherty.
Hence, the oft-cited passage that affirmative action is not required by the
ADA.202
There are reasons why the Daugherty opinion should not be so easily
generalized to other contexts. First, Daugherty involved a plaintiff that
was admittedly not a qualified individual with a disability for the position
either held or desired.2 °3 Similarly, Daugherty was unable to meet the
requirements for two of the three additional positions allegedly offered to
him by the City's personnel office, including a toll booth position, fire
dispatcher, and airport shuttle bus operator °.2  For the positions as a fire
dispatcher and airport shuttle bus operator, Daugherty either failed to meet
the civil service exam requirements or failed to take the exam. °5 For the
toll booth position, Daugherty claimed the personnel office never informed
him of the available position.2 6  Given that, Daugherty should be
distinguished in cases where the plaintiff is indeed a qualified individual
with a disability under the ADA-that is, an individual able to meet the
requirements of the position with or without a reasonable accommodation.
Second, in Daugherty, there was a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy in
place outlining the process for filling vacancies and requiring that full-time
employees be given priority over part-time employees. 20 7 As a result, the
third-party harms were much more relevant to the reassignment inquiry.
Third, the court did little to address the question of whether the City need
have only considered Daugherty for the other full-time positions, an issue
of considerable disagreement in the circuits.2"8 Similarly, the court opinion
does not address the City's duty to reassign Daugherty to vacant part-time
positions.209
202 Id.
203 Id. at 698.
204Id. at 699.
205 Id.
206 ld.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
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As one of the earliest ADA reasonable-accommodation cases, the case
is not entirely responsive to the scope of the employer's duty to
accommodate. The Fifth Circuit does not engage in substantive analysis to
determine what the employer's duty should be but instead references
affirmative action to describe what the employer's duty should not be.21 °
Perhaps the opinion discusses little relating to the employer's duty to
accommodate in large part because the plaintiff's lack of qualifications
rendered its duty a nullity. Ultimately, the affirmative-action analogy is
employed to refer to an employee, who is admittedly unqualified, or at
least ineligible, for his current position and other possible positions with
the City, and who requests that the City disregard its legitimate policy and
assign him to a full-time position ahead of other full-time employees,
despite his lack of qualifications.21' Daugherty's specific context reflects a
particular definition of affirmative action that is centered on both the
plaintiff's lack of qualifications and the disruption of the City's legitimate
and nondiscriminatory policy.2 12 Despite Daugherty's specific context,
however, not all of the cases citing Daugherty adhere to its definition of
affirmative action.213
B. Definition of Affirmative Action Varies Across Opinions
Failure to acknowledge and distinguish the differing definitions and
contexts in which the affirmative-action analogy is utilized has led to
confusing results across opinions. Cases that should be distinguished are
treated as perfectly applicable. In other cases, facts and holdings are
largely mischaracterized.
1. Distinguishable Precedent
In EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, the court denied a reassignment
reasonable-accommodation request by a disabled employee on the grounds
that the chosen applicant was better qualified in terms of productivity.
2 14
In reaching its holding, the Seventh Circuit argued that as long as the
210 Id. at 700.
211 Id. at 699-700.
212 Id.
23' See, e.g., Malabarba v. Chi. Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1998).
214 227 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000).
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employer had a policy of hiring the better candidate, and that policy was
consistently and honestly enforced, the employer did not have a mandatory
duty to reassign the disabled employee to the vacant position. 21 5 The
Seventh Circuit vigorously denounced the EEOC's argument that the
employee was "entitled... to be given more consideration than
nondisabled workers." 216 Furthermore, the court criticized the EEOC for
interpreting reassignment as requiring that the disabled person receive a
preference over a more qualified nondisabled person, provided only that
the disabled person is at least minimally qualified to do the job, and unless
the employer can show undue hardship. 217
In reaching its conclusion, the Humiston-Keeling opinion cited
Malabarba v. Chicago Tribune Co.21 8 as support for its claim that the ADA
does not require affirmative action or mandatory preferences in hiring or
reassignment over nondisabled candidates. 219  The Malabarba case,
however, referenced affirmative action to emphasize the unreasonableness
of the accommodation request given the plaintiff's total lack of
qualifications, not necessarily for the proposition that the reassignment
itself indicated preferential treatment vis-d-vis more qualified applicants.22°
As such, in Humiston-Keeling, affirmative action is defined as preferential
treatment mandating "bonus points" to disabled applicants,2 2 ' while in
Malabarba, affirmative action is defined as an unreasonable
accommodation given the plaintiffs lack of qualifications.222
2. Mischaracterizations
In an Eighth Circuit decision, Huber v. Wal-Mart, the court considered
the question of whether Wal-Mart violated its duty under the ADA by
215 Id. at 1029.
2 16 Id. at 1027.
217 Id. at 1028.
218 149 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 1998).
219 Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1028 (citing Malabarba, 149 F.3d at 699-700).
220 Malabarba, 149 F.3d at 699-700.
221 Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1027.
222 Malabarba, 149 F.3d at 700 ("In our view, these suggested accommodations are
unreasonable; each one would have saddled the Tribune with a duty that is not compelled
by the ADA.").
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declining to grant an accommodation request to a disabled employee,
where the employee was qualified but not the most qualified for the job. 23
Huber sustained an injury while working for her employer and, as a result,
was no longer able to fulfill the essential functions of the job.2 4 After her
injury and subsequent disability, Huber requested a reassignment to
another vacant and equivalent position in the company.225  Wal-Mart,
claiming adherence to its policy of hiring the most qualified individual for
the job, declined the reassignment request and subsequently filled the
position with another nondisabled applicant. 26 The Eighth Circuit held
that Wal-Mart did not violate its duty to provide a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA.227 In reaching its holding, the court noted
that requiring Wal-Mart to turn away a superior applicant for the position
would constitute "affirmative action with a vengeance. 228
The court in Huber cited Midland Brake229 for the proposition that
reassignments are automatic even when there is a superior, non-disabled
candidate for the position.23" This claim, however, mischaracterizes the
Midland Brake court's conclusion. In fact, the Midland Brake court
clearly stated that "[t]he right to reassignment . . . is not absolute." 231
223 486 F.3d 480, 481 (8th Cir. 2007); Dustin J. Manning, Employment Law-Huber v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: Does Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act Require Preferential Treatment of a Disabled Employee?, 31 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 437, 437 (2007) ("Huber furthered a circuit split regarding whether the [ADA]
'requires an employer, as a reasonable accommodation, to give a current disabled employee
preference in filling a vacant position when the employee is able to perform the job duties,
but is not the most qualified candidate."') (quoting id. at 482).
224 Huber, 486 F.3d at 481.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 484.
228 Id. (quoting EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000)).
229 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
2 30 Huber, 486 F.3d at 483 ("In the Tenth Circuit, reassignment under the ADA results
in automatically awarding a position to a qualified disabled employee regardless whether
other better qualified applicants are available, and despite an employer's policy to hire the
best applicant.").
2" Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1166.
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Rather, the decision emphasizes the "interactive process" as necessary in
determining "whether an employee desires reassignment; whether there are
vacant positions available at an equivalent or lesser position; whether such
positions are truly vacant, whether reassignment would interfere with the
rights of other employees or important business policies of the company,
etc. 232  By doing so, the court emphasized that "[o]nly through
consideration in a reasonably interactive way can it be determined whether
an employee desires reassignment., 233
C. Uncovering the Preferential-Treatment Debate
The vast majority of cases referencing affirmative action in reasonable
accommodation opinions do so in the course of rejecting the reasonable
accommodation claim. 34  Most of these cases deny the claim on
preferential treatment grounds.235  For the cases examined, the most
vehement opposition to reasonable accommodation occurs in cases where
the plaintiff is not a qualified individual with a disability as defmed by the
ADA,236 the plaintiffs request is perceived as requiring that the employer
232 Id.
233 Id.
2 34 E.g., Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997); Turco
v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1093-94 (5th Cir. 1996).
235 E.g., Terrell v. USAIR, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir. 1998) (ruling against the
employee on the grounds that she should not receive preferential treatment in the form of a
part-time job if it meant part-time agents without disabilities would be discriminated
against); Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1997)
(providing a hypothetical of a dyslexic worker competing for a job with a non-dyslexic
worker, stating that it is not disability discrimination for the employer to give the promotion
to the best worker even if it is the employee without the disability; to require the employer
to hire based on criteria other than who can do the job better would place the employer at a
disadvantage).
236 See, e.g., Toronka v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 411 F. App'x 719, 726 (5th Cir. 2011)
(affirming summary judgment against plaintiff where plaintiff was not qualified for any of
the positions available at his employer) ("It is not an employer's responsibility to 'fashion' a
new job, as Toronka asserts. For reassignment to be a reasonable accommodation, a
position 'must first exist and be vacant."') (quoting Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d
615, 620 (5th Cir. 1999)); Foreman, 117 F.3d at 810 (finding that plaintiff was not disabled
(continued)
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create a new position entirely,237 or the plaintiff requests some form of
special treatment vis-A-vis other nondisabled employees. 38 For example,
the Seventh Circuit noted its disapproval with such preferential treatment
stating:
To require [the employer] to retain the least able because
of disability would handicap the able-bodied, and that is
not required by the Act. Such handicapping, such
discrimination in favor of the disabled, would invite the
same criticisms as "reverse" discrimination on racial and
sexual grounds-especially in a RIF [reduction in force]
case, where a better worker would lose a job to a worse
one merely because the better worker had the good fortune
not to be disabled.239
The language of the court suggests a particular hostility to preferences
largely on the grounds that this form of special treatment would place the
employer at a competitive disadvantage.
After the plaintiff's reasonable-accommodation claim is dismissed, the
plaintiff can only prevail by establishing a different basis for
discrimination under the ADA.2 40  At this point, much of the analyses
within the preferential-treatment cases center on whether the plaintiff can
demonstrate disparate treatment in the decision not to grant the particular
accommodation request. 41 References to affirmative action often fail to
reach the undue-burden analysis and instead focus on the alleged
under the ADA, lacked qualifications for reassignment, and that plaintiff's accommodation
request was unreasonable); Turco, 101 F.3d at 1093-94 (finding that plaintiff was not a
qualified individual with a disability under the ADA).
237 E.g., Terrell, 132 F.3d at 626 ("Although part-time work, as the statute and
regulations recognize, may be a reasonable accommodation in some circumstances
(particularly where the employer has part-time jobs readily available), we hold that USAir
was not required to create a part-time position for Plaintiff where all part-time positions had
already been eliminated from the company.").
238 E.g., id. at 627.
239 Matthews, 128 F.3d at 1196.
240 Id. at 1195-96.
241 See id.
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preferences reflected in the accommodation request by regarding those
preferences as a proxy for reasonableness--or unreasonableness. 242 One
district court noted its disagreement with such analysis:
Instead of claiming undue hardship, Defendants argue that
the "ADA [does not] require affirmative action in favor of
individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring that
disabled persons be given priority in hiring or
reassignment over those who are not disabled." ... This
line of reasoning diminishes the undue hardship
assessment and shifts a court's focus to whether the
disabled employee received the same opportunity to be
reassigned to a vacant position as available to all
employees without disabilities.... The Court finds that
these provisions do not render the ADA an affirmative
action program, but serve as a method of leveling the
playing field between disabled and nondisabled
employees, in the sense of enabling a disabled worker to
do the job without creating undue hardship on the
employer.24
3
As this passage suggests, once the court identifies what it regards as
preferential treatment, the accommodation is no longer required; it
becomes patently unreasonable, and the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate disparate treatment.24  In most cases, this will be an
insurmountable barrier. The accommodation request is presumptively
unreasonable, and the employer is not required to demonstrate undue
242 See Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that the
court does not interpret that disabled persons are to be given priority over those not disabled
under the ADA, implying that the preference provided to a disabled employee over a
nondisabled employee is a proxy for unreasonableness).
243 Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895, 900-01 (D. Ariz. 1997) (quoting
id.) (granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and finding that defendant's policy
violated the ADA).
244 Matthews, 128 F.3d at 1195-96.
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burden.245  In short, a finding of preferential treatment bypasses the
burden-shifting framework established under the ADA and knocks out the
plaintiff's claim on unreasonableness grounds. The response to the
question of whether a particular accommodation constitutes preferential
treatment and whether preferential treatment exists under the ADA is
dispositive in these cases. 246  Given that, how the term "preferential
treatment" is defined is essential to a court's analysis. Yet, if preferential
treatment is at the heart of the debate, then the term "affirmative action" is
an imprecise proxy that is more likely to add confusion than clarity and
precision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Proponents and advocates of disability rights may be concerned that
some of the definitions utilized by the courts reflect a view of affirmative
action-and possibly, reasonable accommodation-that is centered on the
individual's lack of qualifications or preferential treatment at the expense
of nondisabled individuals. 247  From a political standpoint, there is reason
to be concerned with the use of the affirmative-action frame in court
245 See, e.g., Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288-89 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(explaining the test used to determine disparate treatment, emphasizing that the burden
shifts to the employer to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision;
once provided, the burden again shifts to the employee to prove that the reason provided
was merely a pretext).
246 See, e.g., Ransom, 983 F. Supp. at 901; Aka, 156 F.3d at 1311.
247 It should be noted that even employers have referenced affirmative action when
refusing to grant an accommodation that the employer deems patently unreasonable. By
doing so, these employers have equated unreasonableness to affirmative action. See, e.g.,
Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 374 (7th Cir. 2000) ("United is wrong to say
that it constitutes 'affirmative action' to reassign Gile to a vacant position for which she
was entitled by seniority and which would have accommodated her disability. If United
had reassigned Gile as she requested, the only preferential treatment of Gile would have
been that, unlike nondisabled employees who were not on medical leave, she did not have
to fulfill the technical requirement of casting her November bid.").
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opinions resolving reasonable-accommodation claims.248  As prominent
disability rights advocate Ruth Colker has argued:
Courts in the United States have undermined the
affirmative treatment principles underlying disability
discrimination law, despite the clear statutory language to
the contrary.... Because the statute does not permit a
symmetrical approach in which all individuals can claim
disability discrimination, the courts have had to undermine
the exclusive focus on people with disabilities by
drastically limiting the scope of that class.... One can
therefore find a common anti-affirmative action thread
running through disability, race, and sex antidiscrimination
law in the United States, despite differing statutory
language.
249
The use of the affirmative-action analogy in the disability context will
indeed imbue cases with an air of political controversy as courts250 and
commentators251 have noted. One court even went so far as to grant the
248 See Befort & Donesky, supra note 60, at 1081 ("But as the federal courts
increasingly have used anti-affirmative action rhetoric in interpreting the ADA, the question
arises whether the generally negative reaction toward affirmative action has fueled such
attacks or whether a backlash specifically against the ADA is underway.") (footnote
omitted).
249 Ruth Colker, Hypercapitalism: Affirmative Protections for People with Disabilities,
Illness, and Parenting Responsibilities Under United States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
213, 222 (1997).
250 E.g., Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing
affirmative-action analogy in the context of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act) ("In fact, the
very use of the phrase 'affirmative action' in this context is unfortunate, making it difficult
to talk about any kind of affirmative efforts without importing the special legal and social
connotations of that term.").
251 E.g., Befort & Donesky, supra note 60, at 1049 ("Accordingly, we believe that the
debate should move away from the politically charged label of affirmative action and
towards establishing workable boundaries for determining when an employer is required to
reassign an employee with a qualifying disability as a reasonable accommodation. This
(continued)
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plaintiff's request that the defense counsel be prohibited from using the
term "affirmative action" at trial. 2  Given the highly controversial nature
of the term, courts should exercise caution when referencing it in opinions.
Outside of the political connotations of the term, however, the use of
the affirmative-action analogy by courts is both imprecise and lacking in
sufficient clarity. If some courts are extinguishing plaintiffs' claims by
finding preferential treatment, then the definition of preferential treatment
should be more clearly defined. Similarly, as the debate continues on
whether preferential treatment is required as opposed to permitted for
employees--or more broadly, whether preferential treatment exists under
the ADA at all--courts must acknowledge the contours of the debate and
conduct careful analysis in resolving that question. Such analysis will
require that courts carefully distinguish cases and thoroughly demonstrate
the applicability of other cases. Given that, references to terms such as
"affirmative action" must be sufficiently explained or else removed
altogether. Without adopting a preferred definition of affirmative action,
the multiple and conflicting definitions at work confuse doctrine and may
prevent plaintiffs from prevailing on viable claims.
shift in focus is necessary if the ADA is to fulfill its fundamental goal of assuring that
individuals with disabilities are enabled to participate fully in the American workplace.").
252 See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1136-37 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding district
court's grant of plaintiff's motion to prohibit defense counsel from using terms like
"affirmative action," "special rights," and "preferences" to be harmless error).
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